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Abstract
Can television be used to teach and foster entrepreneurship among youth in
developing countries? We report from a randomized control field experiment of
an edutainment show on entrepreneurship broadcasted over almost three months
on national television in Tanzania. The field experiment involved more than two
thousand secondary school students, where the treatment group was incentivized
to watch the edutainment show. We find short-term evidence of the edutainment
show inspiring the viewers to become more interested in entrepreneurship and
business and shaping non-cognitive traits such as risk- and time preferences, and
long-term evidence of more business startups; in general, the treatment effects
are more pronounced for the female viewers. However, we also find evidence
that the encouragement of entrepreneurship discouraged investment in schooling;
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administrative data show a negative treatment effect on school performance and
long-term survey data show that fewer treated students continue schooling.
JEL Codes: O1, I25
1 Introduction
Edutainment shows have a long history in the developed world and are increasingly
used in developing countries in order to educate the population in different spheres of
life, including health, human rights, and financial literacy.1 But what are the effects of
these shows on the viewers? Do they succeed in becoming a source of knowledge and
inspiration and initiating behavioral change, or are they largely pure entertainment?
These questions are particularly important in the developing world, where poor quality
and severe resource constraints in the educational sector make it pertinent to consider
complementary approaches to education (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011).
The present paper reports from a randomized control field experiment studying
an edutainment show for entrepreneurship, Ruka Juu (“Jump Up”), which was aired
on national television in Tanzania during the spring of 2011. The overall aim of the
edutainment show was to educate and motivate Tanzanian youth on entrepreneurship,
business skills, and financial literacy in order to realize their potential and enable them
to lift themselves out of poverty. The show responded to the great challenge facing the
Tanzanian society of creating economic opportunities for a growing young labor force
in a country with very little formal employment. Tanzania is one of the poorest coun-
tries in the world and 63% of the population are below 25 years.2 It is estimated that
700 000 - 800 000 youth leave the school system every year looking for ways to earn
an income, but only a small fraction obtains formal employment.3 Self-employment
has therefore been promoted by the government of Tanzania in their national devel-
opment youth policies, but very little training and support have been provided to the
youth to enable them to establish and manage small-scale businesses.4 More widely,
1An edutainment show is typically defined as a program that purposely designs and implements
a media message to both entertain and educate, in order to “increase audience knowledge about an
educational issue, create favorable attitudes, and change behavior” (Singhal, Cody, Rogers, and Sabido,
2004). For an overview of recent developments in entertainment education, see Singhal (2013).
22012 Population and Housing Census. National Bureau of Statistics, Dar es Salaam, URT, 2013.
3Finscope survey Tanzania, 2013 (http://www.fsdt.or.tz/) and World Bank report “Tanzania:
Productive jobs wanted”, 2014, The World Bank Group.
4National Youth Development Policy. Ministry of Labour, Employment and Youth Development,
Dar es Salaam, URT, 2007. For a further discussion of the challenges facing youth in Tanzania, see
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the fostering of entrepreneurship is perceived to be a critical part of the policy agenda
in developing countries to expand employment and earning opportunities and to reduce
poverty, particularly for youth and women (Cho and Honorati, forthcoming).
In our study, we randomly selected 43 secondary schools in Dar es Salaam to
take part in a field experiment. We used a symmetric encouragement design, where
the treatment group was incentivized to watch the edutainment show and the control
group was incentivized to watch a weekend movie. To analyze the impact of the edu-
tainment show, we rely on a broad set of data. A few weeks after the end of the show,
we conducted an extensive lab experiment to measure impact on ambitions, business
knowledge, and entrepreneurial traits such as risk, time and competitiveness prefer-
ence. Eight months later, at the end of the school year, we collected administrative
data on school performance. Further, almost two years after the show ended, we con-
ducted a long-term follow-up survey of a randomized subset of the participants in order
to capture the impact of the edutainment show on occupational status, in particular on
business startups. Finally, we complemented the quantitative analysis with focus group
discussions.
Our study provides three main findings, where the effects are largely more pro-
nounced for the female viewers. First, we find strong evidence of the edutainment
show inspiring the viewers in the short term, by increasing their entrepreneurship am-
bitions and to some extent also strengthening entrepreneurial traits, and, consistent
with these short-term effects, we observe that the show caused an increased number
of business startups in the long run. Second, we do not find consistent evidence of
the edutainment show having an impact on the business knowledge of the viewers.
Third, we find that the show in the long term has a negative impact on school perfor-
mance; fewer participants in the treated group pass the final school exam and continue
studying.
The fact that an edutainment show for entrepreneurship caused the students to in-
vest less in education carries a general lesson to the field experimental literature, by
showing the importance of taking a broad view of possible implications of a field in-
tervention. It also raises the question of whether it is recommendable to encourage en-
trepreneurship among youth if this causes them to place less importance on education.
We believe that it is crucial to evaluate this finding in light of the present poor quality
Helgesson (2006). There is also increasing interest in the developed world of targeting the youth with
financial education, but the focus is then more on saving and financial decision-making (Lu¨hrmann,
Serra-Garcia, and Winter, 2012).
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of the secondary education in Tanzania.5 A plausible interpretation of the finding is
that the formal education was largely considered irrelevant by some students, while
the edutainment show was perceived to present perspectives that were beneficial for
their future life situation. It is easy, however, to envision that the encouragement of en-
trepreneurship may work differently in a society with a high quality formal education,
where entrepreneurial ambitions may inspire students to invest more in schooling.
The present paper represents, to our knowledge, the first randomized control field
experiment of an edutainment show in a developing country. The study that comes
closest to ours is Berg and Zia (2013), who evaluate the impact of incorporating fi-
nancial messages in a soap opera in South-Africa.6 They also use a symmetric en-
couragement design, where the treated group was encouraged to watch a soap opera
containing financial messages and the control group was incentivized to watch another
soap opera, aired at the same time. In a follow-up study around four months after the
show ended, they find evidence of behavioral change, where the treated participants
are more likely to borrow from formal sources and less likely to engage in gambling.
They find some evidence of increased financial literacy on topics that were prominent
in the soap opera, but no effect on general financial literacy. Finally, they do not find
any effect on the likelihood to seek financial advice, a topic extensively promoted in
the soap opera, and they argue that this may be due to this message being commu-
nicated by an external character who failed to connect emotionally with the viewers.
The importance of emotional connections is very much in line with the thinking of the
designers of Ruka Juu, where a main idea was to introduce real life individuals, rather
than soap opera fictional characters, as role models for the viewers. In the focus group
discussions, we find strong evidence of the viewers connecting to the life situation and
choices of the contestants in the show, which may contribute to explain why we find
evidence of behavioral changes almost two years after the show ended.
Our paper also relates to the growing literature studying how TV and radio more
5A recent survey of the educational sector in Tanzania showed huge problems with teacher
attendance and the quality of the teaching; see http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/
Spectre-of-poor-quality-education-stalks-Tanzania/.
6Rogers, Vaughan, Swalehe, Rao, Svenkerud, and Sood (1999) is an early study in Tanzania of the
effects of using soap opera on the radio to initiate behavioral change. Using a region not reached by the
radio broadcast as control, the study finds strong effects of the radio show on family planning. Abdulla
(2004) is another early contribution demonstrating the potential of edutainment shows in the context
of a public health campaign in Egypt. In a more recent study using qualitative methods, Ramafoko,
Andersson, and Weiner (2012) demonstrate how a reality show involving five deprived communities in
South Africa targeted social issues like HIV/AIDS, alcohol abuse, and crime.
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generally may cause behavioral change. Jensen and Oster (2009) show that the grad-
ual expansion of cable TV in India caused a decrease in the reported acceptability of
son preference, domestic violence toward women, and fertility, and La Ferrara, Chong,
and Duryea (2012) find that exposure to soap operas in Brazil, which typically depict
families with few children, led to a reduction in fertility, particularly among poorer
women. In a very different context, Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) shows how a radio sta-
tion contributed to the Rwandan genocide, by significantly affecting participation in
violence and killings. These findings demonstrate the power of television and radio,
and our paper complements them by demonstrating that television may also initiate
long-term behavioral changes among youth in entrepreneurship and schooling.
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature studying the role of human capital
and entrepreneurship training in microenterprise development (McKenzie and Woodruff,
2014). Largely, these studies have looked at whether classroom training of small-scale
entrepreneurs may contribute to increased profits and growth of the businesses, but the
scalability of such interventions remains an open question (Berge, Bjorvatn, Juniwaty,
and Tungodden, 2012; Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden, forthcoming a).7 Televised
edutainment shows for entrepreneurship represent an alternative to classroom training,
and the present study demonstrates that such shows can inspire the viewers to be-
come more interested in entrepreneurship and can initiate more business startups, but
also suggests that it may be challenging to teach more complex business knowledge
through television.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a discussion of the back-
ground for the edutainment show and an overview of the research design; Section 3
discusses sample, balance issues, and the experimental design in more detail; Section
4 studies whether the encouragement design caused increased exposure to the edutain-
ment show among the treated students; Section 5 and Section 6 analyze short-term
and long-term effects of the show; Section 7 offers some concluding remarks, while
additional analysis is relegated to Appendix A.
7There are also educational classroom field interventions targeting the youth to make them more
forward-looking in their behavior, see Alan and Ertac (2015).
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2 Background and overview of the research design
We here provide a discussion of the background for the edutainment show and an
overview of the research design.
2.1 Background
Ruka Juu is an edutainment show produced by the NGO Femina HIP, which is a mul-
timedia platform working with youth and communities across Tanzania. Femina HIP
has since 1999 promoted healthy life styles and gender equality, and in recent years in-
creasingly also entrepreneurship and financial literacy, as well as citizen engagement.8
The first season of Ruka Juu was aired on national television in Tanzania from
March to May 2011. The edutainment show consisted of 11 weekly episodes built up
around six young entrepreneurs (three females and three males). They competed for
“the opportunity of their life,” to win a prize of 5 million Tsh (around 3100 USD).
The contestants, all running their own small-scale businesses, were recruited from
semi-urban areas throughout Tanzania with the aim of establishing role models for
the viewers. For example, one of the contestants, Benitha, was selected because she
had managed to establish her own business despite having dropped out of secondary
school due to pregnancy, a common situation for many girls in Tanzania. The audience
followed each contestant through a number of challenges engaging both the contestants
and the viewers to reflect on how to plan and operate a business. Important topics
were market assessment, customer care, marketing, record keeping, credit, savings,
insurance, health, and appearance. The edutainment show had a particular focus on
female empowerment and one episode was specifically assigned to gender issues. It
had an estimated 3.1 million viewers (Tanzania All Media Product Survey) and was
awarded the second prize in the 2013 Pan-African Awards for Entrepreneurship in
Education, in competition with over 350 initiatives from 33 different countries.
8In addition to Ruka Juu, Femina HIP also produce Fema Magazine, Fema Radio Show, and Fema
TV Show. For a further discussion of Ruka Juu, see Ekstro¨m and Sekei (2014).
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2.2 Overview of the research design
The participants were recruited from 43 randomly selected secondary schools in Dar
es Salaam.9 The study was introduced as a research project on youth and media.
21 schools were randomly assigned into the treatment group and 22 schools into the
control group. At each school and before randomization, one class from the last year
of the ordinary level (O-level), also known as Form IV, was selected to participate in
the study.
In January 2011, before the first episode of Ruka Juu was aired, we conducted
a baseline survey containing questions on socioeconomic background, media-habits,
current topics, business issues, and personal ambitions.10 After the baseline survey was
conducted, all students in the selected sample were invited to participate in the study.
The students and their parents had to sign a contract where participants promised to
watch, to the extent possible, the edutainment show (treatment group) or the week-end
movie (control group). The contract also specified that the participants would receive
10 000 Tsh (approximately 7 USD) for participating in the study and that there would
be a possibility to earn additional money in a follow-up session after the edutainment
show had ended.11 All participants selected for the study signed the contract, which
means that our sample should be representative for the secondary school students in
Dar es Salaam.
Midway into the edutainment show we conducted a short survey at all the schools
to remind the participants of their contract. We asked them (among other things) to
rank their favorite episode (of the edutainment show or the week-end movie), where
they normally watched the program, and whether they had missed any episodes.
A few weeks after the edutainment show ended, we conducted an extensive lab
experiment at each school to study the short-term impact, where we collected incen-
tivized measures of the participants’ knowledge of the content of the edutainment
show and the week-end movie, knowledge of business concepts and practices, en-
9We restricted the study to government and community secondary schools, though one private sec-
ondary school was included due to an administrative mistake in the list prepared to us by the district
education officer. There were 127 government and community secondary schools in Dar es Salaam in
2011 (United Republic of Tanzania: Basic Education Statistics Tanzania 2010). It turned out that two
of the schools belonged to the same administrative unit; the results are not sensitive to the removal of
these two schools.
10A translated version of all supplementary material to the field experiment is provided in Appendix
B.
115000 Tsh were paid out when they signed the contract, the remaining 5000 Tsh were paid out when
we did the mid-term survey.
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trepreneurial ambitions and traits, and social preferences. We also asked a series of
non-incentivized questions. The participants were not given any feedback on their per-
formance or earnings during the experiment, and payments were made right after the
experiment, in envelopes that ensured privacy.
To study long-term effects, we collected two sets of data. First, we collected ad-
ministrative data on the participants’ performance on the final O-level exam in Decem-
ber 2011; second, we conducted a long-term survey of occupational status, including
business start-ups, in 2013.
Finally, to supplement the main analysis, we organized focus group discussions
with secondary school students at schools not taking part in the present study. In the
focus groups, we received feed-back on how the edutainment show was perceived by
the viewers, the extent to which they found it useful, and their views on entrepreneur-
ship and self-employment in general.
To summarize, Table 1 provides a timeline for the research project.
[ Table 1 about here. ]
The main methodological challenge when designing a field experiment on a na-
tionally broadcasted TV program is to establish a proper control group. We use a sym-
metric encouragement design, where the treatment group was incentivized to watch
the edutainment show and the control group was incentivized to watch the weekend
movie.12 This feature of the design allows us to rule out that the encouragement in
itself, in particular the economic incentives offered to the students, can account for the
observed treatment effects. We chose the week-end movie for the control group since
it was aired at the same time as the edutainment show and it is hard to see that exposure
to the weekend movie should have any impact on entrepreneurial variables.
3 Sample, balance and attrition
We here provide a more detailed discussion of the sample, the different data sources,
balance, and attrition.
12The weekend movie is a well-established television show in Tanzania, which is supposed to be
a family treat that showcases the best movies from Tanzania, see http://www.eatv.tv/shows/
weekend-movie.
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3.1 Baseline: Survey data
We have 2 132 students from 43 schools in this study. In Table 2 we present a set of
core variables collected in the baseline survey, and include p-values for a test of no
mean difference between treatment and control groups.
[ Table 2 about here. ]
The students are on average 18 years old (16-20 years) and there are slightly more
females than males. 25.7% of the students do not live with their parents, and on average
they lean towards it being quite easy to find a place to watch television.13 The majority
of the students attend the arts stream in secondary school, while 36.6% attend the
business stream which is more practically oriented. At the baseline, we measured
their (business) knowledge and (business) ambitions. The knowledge variable is a
dummy taking the value one if the student has answered correctly all three questions
about the benefit of insurance, how to calculate annual interest on a loan, and how to
understand the concept of profit. The ambition variable is a dummy taking the value
one if the student has responded that he or she would like to spend a 1 million Tsh gift
on starting a business (instead of buying something nice for themselves or their family,
paying for education, or spending the money otherwise). We observe that 25.8% of
the students answered correctly all three knowledge questions, while 11.6% of the
students expressed business ambitions. Finally, we observe that there are on average
49.6 students in each class and that 56.3% of the previous year’s students failed at O-
level (form IV) exam in 2010, where the high failure rate reflects the poor state of the
secondary education in Tanzania.14
We observe that the control group scores higher on the knowledge questions, is
slightly less likely to live with their parents, and has more male students. In line
with the suggestion of Bruhn and McKenzie (2009), we deal with these imbalances by
controlling for the baseline characteristics in the subsequent analysis. Further, since the
edutainment show had a gender focus, we also study separately the treatment effects
for males and females. 15
13The average, 3.4, is between 3: ‘sometimes easy, sometimes difficult’ and 4: ‘quite easy.’ 24.7%
do not have a television at home.
14At the national level, 70% of the students failed the O-level exam in 2010. The lower failure rate
for the schools in the present study largely reflects that these schools are located in the main city of
Tanzania.
15In Appendix A, we provide additional balance tables. Tables A1-A2 provide balance tables for the
baseline sample by gender, Tables A3-A5 provide balance tables for the different subsamples that we
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3.2 Short-term: Lab data
The lab experiment was conducted at the schools and we reached 1 915 of the 2 132
students (89.8%). As shown in columns (1)-(4) in Table 3, attrition is higher in the
treatment group than in the control group, which effectively means that treated students
were less likely to attend school on the day of the experiment. We also observe that
attrition is positively associated with business knowledge and business ambitions (as
measured in the baseline survey).
[ Table 3 about here. ]
To study how robust our findings are to attrition, we report nonparametric upper
and lower bounds on the treatment effects of interest in Appendix A (Lee, 2009).
3.3 Long-term: Administrative data
We collected administrative data about performance on O-level exams from the Na-
tional Examinations Council of Tanzania.
To have a baseline measure of school quality, we collected the failure rate in 2010
for all the schools included in this study, as reported in Table 2. The students tak-
ing part in the present study took the O-level exam in December 2011, around eight
months after the edutainment show ended. Their exam performance thus allows us to
study how the edutainment show impacted long-term educational attainment. We man-
aged to collect exam results for 2039 of the 2135 students (95.5%), and as shown in
columns (5)-(8) in Table 3, attrition is not correlated with treatment for the long-term
administrative data.
3.4 Long-term: Survey data
Finally, to investigate the long-term effect of the edutainment show on occupational
status and, in particular, on business start-ups, we conducted an intensive tracking
survey of 430 randomly selected participants during the summer of 2013, around two
years after the edutainment show had ended and 18 months after the students had
finished their Form IV education. The selected sub-sample was identified by randomly
reached in the different follow-up rounds. In Figure A1 in Appendix A, we provide an overview of the
distribution of the share of females across schools. We note that there is one male-only school in the
control group. All our results are robust to the removal of this school from the sample.
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drawing ten participants from each of the 43 schools. Through an extensive search, we
were able to reach and do a phone interview with 286 of the 430 selected participants
(66.5%). As shown in columns (9)-(12) in Table 3, attrition is not correlated with
treatment for the long-term survey data.
4 Did the encouragement design work?
We first consider whether our encouragement design succeeded in creating an exoge-
nous difference in exposure to the edutainment show between the treatment group
and the control group. To study this question, we conducted incentivized tests of the
participants’ knowledge of the content of the edutainment show as well as of the week-
end movies. Each test consisted of ten multiple-choice questions and the participants
earned 100 Tsh for each correct answer.
[ Table 4 about here. ]
From the first two columns in Table 4, we observe that there is a large and sta-
tistically significant difference in the number of correct answers on program content
between the two groups, with the treatment group clearly knowing more about the edu-
tainment show and less about the weekend movies than the control group. This applies
to both females and males. The treatment group had almost two more correct answers
on the content of the edutainment show than the control group, which amounts to ap-
proximately one standard deviation. The treatment differences in program exposure
are confirmed by the last two columns of Table 4, which report regressions on the self-
reported number of episodes watched by the treatment group and the control group
respectively. The treated students report to have watched significantly more episodes
of the edutainment show and significantly fewer episodes of the weekend movies than
the control group students.
We observe that the treated participants on average watched 5.7 out of the 11
episodes of the edutainment show. Two main reasons were brought forward for not
watching all the episodes. First, the students expressed difficulty in getting access to a
television: “You know, if I am sitting alone and grown-ups come and there are two of
them and they are interested in soap operas. Then there are two of them against me,
and they forcefully take away the freedom you have of watching . . . So I usually just let
them be.” Second, there were frequent power cuts in Dar es Salaam in the period when
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the edutainment show was broadcasted: “I only watched two episodes because later on
we had electricity cut-down problems at our place and I couldn’t find another way to
watch.” The fact that the students had problems fully complying with the contract thus
illustrates the challenging learning environment that these students face.
To summarize, we find clear evidence of the encouragement design causing an
exogenous difference between the treatment group and the control group in exposure to
the edutainment show. We now turn to a discussion of how this affected the participants
in the short term and the long term.
5 Short-term impact: Inspiring or educative?
An important aim of the edutainment show was to inspire the viewers to become inter-
ested in entrepreneurship and to consider starting their own business. The focus group
discussions suggested that the edutainment show succeeded in this respect, as reflected
in the following quote by one of the participants: “I can say that Ruka Juu has inspired
me to be more determined to succeed and to expand my business. I was thinking if
there was a school about business and how to manage it, I would have joined so that I
can broaden my knowledge.”
In the lab experiment, we included several measures of the participants’ interest in
entrepreneurship, both incentivised and non-incentivized. The incentivized measure
was introduced at the end of the lab experiment, where the participants were given
the choice between a participation fee of 4 000 Tsh or participation in two weekend
courses on business training. The price of each course was 2 000 Tsh, which would
be subtracted from the cash payment at the end of the lab session.16 60% of the par-
ticipants did not sign up for any of the two business courses, while 10% signed up for
both courses.
The first column in Table 5 reports from a regression of the willingness to spend
4 000 TSh on further training. We observe that there is a significant effect of the
edutainment show on the female participants. The treated female students are almost
six percentage points more likely to sign up for the courses, corresponding to 0.22
16The two courses offered were on how to start up and operate a new business (Course 1) and on
how to access microfinance and apply for a business loan (Course 2). The participants were told that (i)
the courses would be offered by experts, (ii) there would be a limited number of seats, (iii) invitation
to attend would be randomly distributed among those who signed up for a course, and (iv) they would
be paid back the course fee if they were not selected. In total, 62 participants were offered a business
course in the fall of 2011. Our long-term results are robust to the removal of these participants.
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of a standard deviation.17 There is no treatment effect for the male students. In the
second and third columns, we report regressions on non-incentivized measures of en-
trepreneurial ambitions. The second column reports the results for a non-incentivized
question on what type of course the participants would take if they were given a free,
week-long training course, where we consider the probability of them choosing “train-
ing in entrepreneurship.”18 For both male and female participants, there is a strong
effect of the edutainment show, with an increase in the probability of choosing en-
trepreneurship training of almost 0.25 of a standard deviation. We also asked the par-
ticipants whether they would prefer to start a business of their own over other careers
(private sector employee, government employee, farmer) if income and hours were ex-
actly the same across alternatives. We observe from the third column that the treatment
group is more likely to report a preference for starting their own business, where this
effect is particularly strong and highly significant for the male participants. Finally, in
the fourth column of Table 5 we consider the treatment effect on an index combining
the three ambition measures. Overall, for both male and female participants, there is
a strong treatment effect on the ambition index, which clearly demonstrates that the
edutainment show succeeded in inspiring the viewers to become more interested in
entrepreneurship and business.
[ Table 5 about here. ]
A possible mechanism for explaining the increased interest in entrepreneurship and
business could be that the edutainment show made the particular kind of small-scale
business operated by the contestants more attractive (restaurant, tailor, cosmetic shop,
soft drink distributor, hairdresser, electricity supplier). To study this mechanism in
more detail, we asked the participants where they saw themselves five years in the
future. We asked them to rank 29 different career paths, including non-business career
paths (teacher, government office employee, police officer, nurse, student), the career
paths of the edutainment show contestants, and other business career paths. Overall,
we find suggestive evidence of the contestants being perceived as role models and their
career choices being a source of inspiration for the viewers. In particular, we find a
borderline significant effect on how the female viewers evaluated the career paths of
17The treatment effect is slightly higher, but less precisely estimated, if we consider the probability
that they sign up for at least one of the two courses.
18The other alternatives were “training in office work,” “training on health issues,” “vocational train-
ing,” and “don’t know.”
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the contestants in the edutainment show (0.089 standard deviations, p = 0.106), but
no statistically significant on other business career paths (0.041 standard deviation,
p = 0.356). Treated male viewers, on the other hand, evaluated both categories more
positively (0.105 and 0.129 standard deviation, p = 0.019 and p = 0.018). We do
not observe any effect on how the treated students evaluated the non-business career
paths (males: −0.028, standard deviation p= 0.557, females: 0.01 standard deviation,
p= 0.858).19
The edutainment show also aimed at educating the participants, by providing them
with business knowledge and by focussing on the importance of having an entrepreneurial
mindset. With respect to business knowledge, the edutainment show provided factual
information, introduced key business concepts, and highlighted good business prac-
tices with respect to, among other things, marketing, customer care, and record keep-
ing. In order to measure the impact of the edutainment show on business knowledge,
the participants answered a set of 24 incentivised multiple-choice questions on macroe-
conomic facts, business facts, business concepts, and business practices, where the par-
ticipants were paid 100 Tsh for each correct answer. The questions had been covered
in the edutainment show and were developed in collaboration with the producers of the
show as well as experts from the University of Dar es Salaam Entrepreneurship Centre,
who had been involved in its design and implementation. To illustrate, one question on
key business concepts was: “What is profit?” The four answers the participants had to
choose among were: A: “Profit is sales of the most important products.”; B: “Profit is
sales minus the cost of goods and operating expenses.”; C: “Profit is sales minus cost
of goods and what you take home from the business.” D: “Profit is sales plus cost of
goods and operating expenses.”20
Table 6 reports regressions on the number of correct answers to the four subindicies
of questions as well as the total number of correct answers. We do not find a systematic
treatment effect of the edutainment show on the incentivized test on business knowl-
edge in the lab. We observe that there is a statistically significant positive treatment
19We asked the participants to rank each of the career paths on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to
5 (very likely). The p-values are from separate regressions for each of the three categories of career
paths, where the dependent variable is the average score given by an individual to all career paths in the
relevant category; otherwise, the regressions are specified as in tables 4-7.
20 Questions illustrating the other categories are: “How many percent of Tanzanians have a bank ac-
count?”(Macro facts); “When do you have to prepare a financial statement for tax estimation?” (Busi-
ness facts); and “Which of the following is an important part of customer service?” (Business practices).
See Appendix B for a complete list of the business knowledge questions.
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effect on the knowledge about macroeconomic facts among the male viewers, but also
that there is a statistically significant negative treatment effect on the understanding
of business concepts among the female viewers. Otherwise, we do not observe any
statistically significant effects. The overall impression from the business knowledge
test is therefore that the edutainment show largely did not succeed in transferring busi-
ness knowledge to the viewers. This impression is to some extent confirmed by the
focus group discussions, which revealed that the viewers did not remember much of
the factual information covered by the edutainment show. Participants in the focus
groups mostly did not even remember that there had been any fact sheets displayed
on the television screen, despite them appearing in every episode of the edutainment
show. Moreover, the episodes covering classroom training led by facilitators from the
University of Dar es Salaam and a guest speaker from Tanzania Revenue Authority
were hardly mentioned at all by the focus group participants.
The focus group discussions did, however, reveal that some viewers felt that they
had gained knowledge about business practices from observing the participants, par-
ticularly with respect to customer service: “I learnt to be attentive to the customers and
listen to their needs, and not to shout at the customers but have a good language and
general cleanliness in the business environment.” We can therefore not rule out that the
edutainment show transmitted some business knowledge to the viewers, not captured
by our test.
[ Table 6 about here. ]
The edutainment show also conveyed the importance of having an entrepreneurial
mindset, including patience and the willingness to take risks.21 This was reflected in
the focus group discussions where viewers expressed admiration for the risk-taking
behavior of the contestants: “I liked the entrepreneur, the one with the cosmetics shop.
I liked the way she handled the situation when the goods were stolen, she accepted
the situation and moved on. She didn’t panic although she had incurred a loss because
21Which traits are essential for becoming a successful entrepreneur is still a major research question,
and the answer will most likely vary across different types of business environments and cultures. There
is some evidence, though, suggesting that the willingness to take risk is an important determinant of the
decision to become self-employed in various environments, see for example (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman,
Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner, 2011; Hvide and Panos, 2013; Berge, Pires, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden,
forthcoming b), and there is evidence suggesting that poverty may cause risk-averse and short-sighted
decision-making (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014). The focus of the present edutainment show on risk-
taking and patience was largely based on advice from the experts from the University of Dar es Salaam
Entrepreneurship Centre, who have worked with the local business community for years.
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as an entrepreneur one has to realize that one is investing and that there are risks in
the process.” Viewers also expressed that they had been impressed by the contestants’
willingness to save and to take a long-term perspective.
To study whether the edutainment show had made the viewers adopt a more en-
trepreneurial mindset, we conducted a series of incentivized tests in the lab to elicit
risk, time, and competitiveness preferences.22 To elicit risk preferences, we asked the
participants in the lab to choose between a safe alternative and a risky alternative in
three different situations, where one of the situations was randomly selected to deter-
mine the payment from this part of the experiment. The payoffs were the same for all
three situations; in the safe option 2 000 Tsh, and in the risky option 4 000 Tsh if lucky
and zero if unlucky. The only difference between the situations was the probability of
the lucky outcome in the risky option (25%, 50%, 75%). From Table 7, we observe
that watching the edutainment show significantly increases the female viewers’ will-
ingness to take risk, about 0.2 standard deviation, while we do not observe any effect
on the males.23 One possible explanation for the female-specific effect on risk pref-
erences may be that the edutainment show had an effect on the viewers’ perceptions
of females as risk takers, which then shaped the female viewers’ willingness to take
risk. In fact, when we asked the participants in the lab what they considered the most
common characteristic of Tanzanian business women, a significantly larger share of
both males and females in the treatment group chose “Risk taker” (males, p = 0.004;
females, p = 0.002).24 It thus appears that the edutainment show shaped perceptions
about females as risk takers, and, ultimately, also the female viewers’ risk preferences.
[ Table 7 about here. ]
To analyze the impact on time preferences, we asked the participants to make
choices in two sets of situations. In the first set of situations, the participants chose
between receiving 1 000 Tsh today and a larger amount of money after eight weeks.
22We also conducted incentivised tests of their social preferences, to see whether the edutainment
show and the focus on entrepreneurship and business made the participants more selfish or meritocratic
(Cappelen, Drange Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2007; Alma˚s, Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden,
2010; Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2010). As shown in Table A14 in Appendix A, we do not
find any impact of the show on the social preferences.
23In the main analysis, we take the number of times they chose the risky option as a measure of
a participant’s willingness to take risk. In Figure A2, we show that the reported result is robust to
alternative definitions of risky behavior.
24The alternative characteristics were “Fast in decision making”, “Good at collaborating”, and “Never
give up”.
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They made this choice in three situations where the amount of money received at the
later dates varied (1 500, 3 000, and 5 000 Tsh). In the second set of situations, they
made the same three choices, but now between money in eight weeks or money in six-
teen weeks. For each of the two sets of situations, one situation was randomly drawn
to determine the payment from this part of the experiment. We observe from Table 7
that the same gender specific pattern emerges as for risk preferences, the edutainment
show has a positive effect (but not statistically significant) on the female viewers, but
no effect on the male viewers.25
In measuring competition preferences, we followed the approach of Niederle and
Vesterlund (2007). The participants were first asked to add up numbers for three min-
utes, where they received 200 Tsh per correct answer. They were then asked about
their beliefs about how well they performed compared to the others in the session. Fi-
nally, they were told to do another round of adding up numbers, but this time could
choose between a fixed payment of 100 Tsh per correct answer or a payment of 300
Tsh per correct answer if they performed as least as well as the average in the previous
round in their session, and zero if they performed worse than the average. As shown
in the third column of Table 7, we do not find any treatment effect on the willingness
to compete, neither for males nor females.26
Finally, we report treatment effects for the mind-set index in Table 7, which com-
bines the three mind-set dimensions. We observe a positive (but not statistically sig-
nificant effect) for females, which reflects that the edutainment show shaped their risk
and time preferences, but did not have any effect on the competitiveness preferences.
For the males, we observe no effect on the mind-set index, consistent with the absence
of an effect on any of the separate mind-set variables.
In sum, the results from the lab experiment and focus group discussion show that
the edutainment show in the short run had a significant positive effect on the en-
trepreneurship ambitions, but weaker and less systematic effects on the knowledge
and mind-set of the viewers.
25In the main analysis, we take the number of times they chose the later payment date as a measure
of their patience. The participants were on average more patient when choosing payments in the future
(p < 0.01), but we obtain very similar estimates of treatment effects if we run separate regressions for
the two sets of situations. In Figure A3, we show that we get statistically significant treatment effects
on patience if we define patience as choosing the later payment date at least five times.
26There was also no statistically significant difference between the treatment group and the control
group in beliefs about own performance (males, p= 0.82; females, p= 0.39).
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6 Long-term impact on behavior
We now turn to a discussion of the impact of the edutainment show on long-term
behavior, both with respect to school performance and occupational status, including
business startups.
We observed that the edutainment show made more students have entrepreneur-
ship ambitions in the short-run. This increased interest in entrepreneurship could make
them put more effort into school work, if they perceived the school activities or school
performance to be important in order to succeed in business. But the edutainment
show might also cause a substitution away from school work, if the schooling is seen
as irrelevant for business and the students find it more beneficial to spend time explor-
ing business opportunities. To study the long-term effect of increased entrepreneur-
ship ambitions on school performance, we collected administrative data on whether
the students passed the O-level exam, which they took around eight months after the
edutainment show ended.
Strikingly, we observe from Figure 1 that the treatment group performed signifi-
cantly worse in the school exam than the control group; the fraction that passed the
O-level exam is significantly lower in the treatment group than in the control group
(males: 51.9% versus 64.3%, p= 0.15; females: 44.2 versus 66.9, p= 0.001).27 This
finding suggests that the increased focus on entrepreneurship as a possible career path
made the students less motivated to study hard at school.
The attrition analysis in Table 3 sheds further light on how the edutainment show
affected the students’ investment in schooling, since attrition at the lab experiment
is equivalent to not attending school on the day of the research visit.28 We observe
from Table 3 that the edutainment show had a negative treatment effect on school at-
tendance, which suggests that increased entrepreneurial focus made the students less
interested in school activities. Further, we note from Table 3 that there is a significant
negative association between business ambitions at baseline and school attendance;
students that stated that they would use 1 million Tsh to start a business are seven per-
centage points less likely to attend school. This suggests that students do not consider
schooling to be particularly relevant for business. Overall, our analysis shows that the
27For the long-term results, the corresponding regression analysis is presented in Table A17.
28It appears very unlikely that anyone would refrain from attending school that day to avoid taking
part in the lab experiment. First, the date of the lab experiment was not announced to the students
in advance. Second, the lab experiment represented a possibility for earning money, which made it
attractive for the students to take part in it.
18
edutainment show affected school performance negatively, by making them less moti-
vated for school and thereby lower their school attendance (and possibly also the effort
they put into school more generally).
[ Figure 1 about here. ]
Almost two years after the intervention, we again surveyed the participants to study
whether the edutainment show had had an impact on long-term occupational status,
with a special focus on whether it had caused any of them to start their own business.
We observe from panel A in Figure 2 that this is indeed the case among the female
participants; the probability of having started up a business is 8.8 percentage points
higher in the treatment group than in the control group (34.14% versus 25.33%, p =
0.10).29 We do not find a similar treatment effect on startups for the males (26.8%
versus and 28.1%). Interestingly, our long-term findings on business startups are very
similar to our short-term findings on the demand for business training, as reported in
Table 5. First, the size of the effect for females is almost the same for business startups
as for the demand for business training (8.8 percentage points versus 5.8 percentage
points), and second, for both measures there is no effect for the males.
[ Figure 2 about here. ]
Consistent with more females having failed the O-level exam and having started a
business, we observe in panel B in Figure 2 that it is less likely that they self-report
currently being a student (47.6% versus 60.0%, p = 0.11).30 In this case, we also
observe a strong negative effect for the males (30.4% versus 62.0%, p= 0.01).
In panels C and D in Figure 2 we report long-term effects on employment and
whether the students have moved since secondary school.31 In panel C, we observe
that it is less likely that the treated students are employed, but these effects are not
29The participants reported having started various types of kiosks and retail activities on the street,
including selling snacks, water, chips, or other small products. Others had entered into repair work,
computers, general welding, and low level financial intermediation (tigo pesa or m-pesa). The p-value
is here from a one-sided test of equality, since the initial hypothesis clearly was that the edutainment
show should increase the likelihood of starting a business. See also Table A17, which shows that the
business startup effect for females is only borderline significant in the regression analysis.
30We do not have detailed data on what they are studying. They may have continued with A-level
secondary schooling, vocational education or be repeating classes for a retake of the O-level exam.
31In the long-term survey, we also collected information on marriage and child-bearing; 9% of the
participants were married and 8.2% had or expected a child. We do not find any difference between the
treatment group and the control group on these two variables.
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statistically significant (males: 9.0% versus 11.2%, p = 0.70, females: 10.0% versus
17.3%, p = 0.25). In panel D we observe that it is more likely that the treated par-
ticipants have moved, which is consistent with the edutainment show making them
more entrepreneurial in their thinking and therefore also more willing to move in or-
der to seek out economic opportunities. The treatment effect on whether they have
moved is statistically significant for females, but not for males (males: 25% versus
17.1%,p= 0.26; females: 36.6% versus 23.3%, p= 0.05).
Taken together, the long-term findings provide strong evidence for the edutainment
show having shaped the long-term behavior of the viewers. In particular, we observe
that the edutainment show caused poorer school performance and made it less likely
that the students continued schooling, and, correspondingly, we find an increase in
business startups for the female viewers.
7 Concluding remarks
We have shown that an edutainment show on entrepreneurship broadcasted on national
television had both a short-term and a long-term impact on the youth in a developing
country where there are few formal employment opportunities; in the short-term, it
made the viewers more interested in entrepreneurship and business and shaped non-
cognitive traits, and in the long-term it generated more business startups. Our study
thus demonstrates that an edutainment show has the potential to both inspire and initi-
ate behavioral change. At the same time, we find limited evidence of the show impact-
ing the business knowledge of the viewers, which suggests that it is more challenging
to use an edutainment as a vehicle for knowledge transmission. Finally, we find that
encouragement of entrepreneurship caused the youth to invest less in schooling, which
seems to reflect that they do not consider the present education to be particularly rel-
evant for business. This spillover effect from entrepreneurship education to schooling
serves as a reminder of the importance of taking a broad view when evaluating the
impact of different field interventions.
Edutainment shows broadcasted on television and radio represent an intriguing
approach to a host of development issues, since they are potentially low-cost inter-
ventions with large outreach. More research is therefore needed to understand how
these shows impact viewers and initiate behavioral and social change. In particular,
an open question remains whether there are ways of making edutainment shows a ve-
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hicle for knowledge transmission, and as such a complement to the formal education,
particularly in developing countries. Another interesting avenue for future research is
to study whether edutainment shows may be used in different settings in addition to
being broadcasted on television, for example at schools or in villages by the use of
mobile cinema, and thereby serve as a point of departure for teaching and community
discussions. Finally, the digital revolution opens up new approaches to edutainment
education, where for example digital games allow individuals to explore and learn by
role-taking (Singhal, 2013), and it will be interesting for future research to tap into
these opportunities and study how they can support human capital formation in devel-
oping countries.
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Figure 1: Share that passed final exam
Note: The figure reports the share of participants that passed the final O-level exam
in 2011, by treatment and gender. Standard errors (clustered on school level) are indi-
cated.
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Figure 2: Long-term impact on behavior
Note: The figure reports from the long-term survey, by treatment and gender. Panel A:
The share of participants who have started a business. Panel B: The share of partici-
pants who are currently a student. Panel C: The share of students who are currently
employed. Panel D: The share of students who have moved since secondary school.
Standard errors (clustered on school level) are indicated.
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Table 1: Timeline of the research project
Period Event
1. January 2011 Baseline study and focus group discussions
2. Spring 2011 11 episodes of Ruka Juu aired
3. March 2011 Mid-term quiz
4. June 2011 Lab experiment and focus group discussions
5. Spring 2012 Collection of administrative data from (Dec 2011) exams
6. Spring and summer 2013 Long-term follow-up
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Table 2: Treatment-Control Balance
Treatment status
All Control Treated Difference p-value
Male 0.445 0.516 0.369 -0.147 0.005
(0.027) (0.037) (0.032) (0.050)
Age 17.91 17.94 17.89 -0.041 0.736
(0.059) (0.076) (0.093) (0.076)
Household with no parents 0.257 0.231 0.286 0.056 0.005
(0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019)
Access to tv 3.404 3.350 3.463 0.113 0.270
(0.052) (0.085) (0.054) (0.102)
Business stream 0.383 0.346 0.422 0.076 0.601
(0.073) (0.102) (0.102) (0.144)
Business knowledge 0.258 0.289 0.224 -0.066 0.085
(0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.037)
Business ambitions 0.116 0.107 0.125 0.018 0.409
(0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.021)
O-level failure rate for school 0.563 0.574 0.551 -0.023 0.621
(0.023) (0.025) (0.038) (0.046)
Note: The table reports means of baseline variables by treatment. Male: indicator vari-
able taking the value one if the participant is a male; Age: the age of the participant
in years; Household with no parents: indicator variable taking the value one if the par-
ticipant does not live with any of the parents; Access to tv: response to “If you want
to watch your favourite TV-program, how easy is it for you to find a place to watch
it?”, scale from 1 (very difficult) to 5 (very easy); Business stream: indicator variable
taking the value one if the participant is in the business stream at school; Business
knowledge: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant answered cor-
rectly three questions about insurance, interest rate, and profits. Business ambitions:
response to “What would you do if you had 1 million Tsh?” (1=Use them to buy some-
thing nice for myself or my family; 2= Use them to start a business; 3=Use them to
pay for my education; 4= Other); O-level failure rate for school: the failure rate of the
O-level exam in 2010 for the school of the participant. For two schools, we have used
the 2012 failure rate, since 2010 data were not available. The p-value is for a test of no
difference in means. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the school level.
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Table 4: Impact on exposure to the edutainment show
Content question Episodes watched
(Incentivized) (Non-incentivized)
Edutainment Weekend movie Edutainment Weekend movie
Treated (edutainment) 1.700∗∗∗ -1.417∗∗∗ 3.326∗∗∗ -1.575∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.134) (0.271) (0.272)
Treated × male 0.113 -0.023 0.209 -0.143
(0.202) (0.180) (0.318) (0.292)
Male -0.227∗ -0.367∗∗∗ -0.170 -0.069
(0.122) (0.134) (0.181) (0.253)
Treatment on males 1.813∗∗∗ -1.440∗∗∗ 3.535∗∗∗ -1.718∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.200) (0.290) (0.233)
Observations 1898 1898 1850 1882
R2 0.233 0.169 0.326 0.069
Statistics on dependent variable (in control group):
Mean 3.710 6.159 2.184 3.762
Standard deviation 1.678 1.879 2.489 3.582
Note: The table reports linear regressions in which the dependent variable is: column
1, the participant’s number of correct answers about program content of the edutain-
ment show (incentivised, 0-10); column 2, the participant’s number of correct answers
about program content of the weekend movie (incentivized, 0-10); column 3, num-
ber of episodes the participant watched of the edutainment show (self-reported, 0-11);
column 4, number of episodes the participant watched of the weekend movie (self-
reported, 0-11). Treated: indicator variable for the participant being in the treatment
group. Treated × male: interaction variable between Treated and Male. Male: indi-
cator variable taking the value one if the participant is a male. Also included in the
regressions but not reported are the other background variables reported in Table 2.
See Table A6 in Appendix A for full regressions including all controls. Treatment
on Males: the linear combination of Treated and Treated × male. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered on schools (∗ : p < 0.10,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗∗∗ : p < 0.01).
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Table 5: Impact on ambitions
Demand for business training Rating of having Ambition
Incentivized Self-report own business index
Treated (edutainment) 0.058∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.119 0.259∗∗
(0.032) (0.039) (0.084) (0.108)
Treated × male -0.045∗ 0.026 0.078 0.015
(0.026) (0.047) (0.104) (0.107)
Male 0.016 -0.054 -0.041 -0.066
(0.018) (0.040) (0.071) (0.091)
Treatment on males 0.012 0.138∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.035) (0.071) (0.074)
Observations 1898 1893 1847 1843
R2 0.008 0.043 0.014 0.038
Statistics on dependent variable (in control group):
Mean 0.079 0.573 2.776 1.210
Standard deviation 0.270 0.495 0.948 1.000
Note: The table reports linear regressions in which the dependent variable is: column
1, an indicator variable taking the value one if the participant wants to spend 4000
Ths on two additional weekend courses in entrepreneurship; column 2, an indicator
variable taking the value one if the participant chooses training in entrepreneurship
as the preferred free week-long training course; column 3, a variable reflecting how
the participant ranks (if income and work hours were kept constant) having an own
business relative to being employed in public sector, being employed in private sec-
tor, and farming, (1-4, 4=own business is ranked as first choice), column 4, an index
which is the sum of the indicator variables from columns 1 and 2 and an indicator
variable taking the value one if the dependent variable in column 3 takes the value 4
(own business is ranked as first choice). Treated: indicator variable for the participant
being in the treatment group. Treated: indicator variable for the participant being in
the treatment group.Treated × male: interaction variable between Treated and Male.
Male: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant is a male. Also included
in the regressions but not reported are the other background variables reported in Table
2. See Table A8 in Appendix A for full regressions including all controls. Treatment
on Males: the linear combination of Treated and Treated × male. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered on schools (∗ : p < 0.10,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗∗∗ : p < 0.01).
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Table 6: Impact on knowledge
Subindices
Macro Business:
Facts Facts Concepts Practice Knowledge index
Treated (edutainment) 0.038 0.049 -0.170∗ -0.110 -0.192
(0.094) (0.054) (0.097) (0.139) (0.243)
Treated × male 0.141 -0.003 0.051 0.098 0.287
(0.113) (0.066) (0.107) (0.159) (0.284)
Male 0.289∗∗∗ -0.053 0.145∗∗ 0.135 0.517∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.053) (0.069) (0.110) (0.188)
Treatment on males 0.179∗ 0.046 -0.119 -0.012 0.095
(0.096) (0.042) (0.089) (0.134) (0.253)
Observations 1898 1898 1898 1898 1898
R2 0.020 0.009 0.047 0.027 0.042
Statistics on dependent variable (in control group):
Mean 2.204 0.855 1.509 1.509 8.617
Standard deviation 1.286 0.719 0.875 0.875 2.625
Note: The table reports linear regressions in which the dependent variable is the par-
ticipant’s number of correct answers on incentivized questions about different topics
taught by the edutainment show: Macroeconomic facts (0-8); Business facts (0-3);
Business concepts (0-3); Business practices (0-10); Knowledge index (0-24, sum of
all answers). Treated: indicator variable for the participant being in the treatment
group. Treated × male: interaction variable between Treated and Male. Male: indi-
cator variable taking the value one if the participant is a male. Also included in the
regressions but not reported are the other background variables reported in Table 2.
See Table A10 in Appendix A for full regressions including all controls. Treatment
on Males: the linear combination of Treated and Treated × male. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered on schools (∗ : p < 0.10,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗∗∗ : p < 0.01).
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Table 7: Impact on mindset
Mind-set
Risk Patience Compete index
Treated (edutainment) 0.145∗∗ 0.164 -0.056 0.114
(0.069) (0.189) (0.107) (0.133)
Treated × male -0.148∗ -0.210 0.083 -0.102
(0.075) (0.162) (0.079) (0.130)
Male 0.091∗ -0.082 0.008 0.050
(0.049) (0.084) (0.062) (0.089)
Treatment on males -0.003 -0.046 0.028 0.013
(0.076) (0.136) (0.087) (0.119)
Observations 1898 1898 1897 1897
R2 0.015 0.015 0.040 0.012
Statistics on dependent variable (in control group):
Mean 1.329 3.375 0.375 2.763
Standard deviation 0.718 1.497 0.484 1.000
Note: The table reports linear regressions in which the dependent variable is: column
1, the number of times the participant chooses the risky alternative (0-3); column 2,
the number of times the participant chooses the later payment date (0-6); column 3, an
indicator variable taking the value one if the participant chooses to compete (column
3); column 4, a mind-set index of the dependent variables in columns 1-3 in which
each variable is weighted by the inverse standard deviation in the control group and
then normalized to have unit variance in the control group. Treated: indicator vari-
able for the participant being in the treatment group. Treated × male: interaction
variable between Treated and Male. Male: indicator variable taking the value one if
the participant is a male. Also included in the regressions but not reported are the
other background variables reported in Table 2. See Table A12 in Appendix A for
full regressions including all controls. Treatment on Males: the linear combination of
Treated and Treated × male. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools
(∗ : p < 0.10,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗∗∗ : p < 0.01).
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A Appendix: Additional analysis
We here provide complementary analysis, as referred to in the main text.
A.1 Additional figures
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Figure A1: Distributions of gender composition by treatment
Note: Histograms of share of females at each school by treatment.
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Figure A2: Treatments effect on willingness to take risk (alternative definitions)
Note:The figure reports the treatment effects for males and females on risk for alter-
native definitions of the willingness to take risk. The willingness to take risk is here
defined by an indicator variable that takes the value one if the participant chooses the
risky alternative at least 1/2/3 times.
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Figure A3: Treatment effects on patience (alternative definitions)
Note:The figure reports the treatment effects for males and females on patience for
alternative definitions. Patience is here defined by an indicator variable that takes the
value one if the participant chooses the later payment date at least 1/2/3/4/5/6 times.
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A.2 Additional tables
Table A1: Treatment-Control Balance (males)
Treatment status
All Control Treated Difference p-value
Age 18.28 18.29 18.27 -0.019 0.913
(0.079) (0.090) (0.146) (0.172)
Household with no parents 0.258 0.236 0.292 0.056 0.053
(0.014) (0.018) (0.022) (0.028)
Access to tv 3.415 3.338 3.468 0.087 0.452
(0.062) (0.093) (0.068) (0.115)
Business stream 0.296 0.238 0.385 0.147 0.289
(0.067) (0.080) (0.111) (0.137)
Business knowledge 0.235 0.272 0.179 -0.093 0.011
(0.020) (0.027) (0.023) (0.035)
Business ambitions 0.143 0.126 0.170 0.044 0.147
(0.014) (0.016) (0.025) (0.029)
O-level failure rate for school 0.573 0.582 0.558 -0.024 0.670
(0.025) (0.026) (0.049) (0.056)
Note: For details, see Table 2.
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Table A2: Treatment-Control Balance (females)
Treatment status
All Control Treated Difference p-value
Age 17.62 17.56 17.67 0.116 0.260
(0.052) (0.067) (0.076) (0.101)
Household with no parents 0.257 0.225 0.283 0.058 0.007
(0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.021)
Access to tv 3.396 3.318 3.460 0.143 0.262
(0.062) (0.106) (0.067) (0.125)
Business stream 0.452 0.462 0.444 -0.018 0.912
(0.078) (0.118) (0.103) (0.157)
Business knowledge 0.276 0.308 0.250 -0.058 0.240
(0.024) (0.038) (0.031) (0.049)
Business ambitions 0.094 0.088 0.099 0.012 0.622
(0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.023)
O-level failure rate for school 0.555 0.565 0.547 -0.018 0.673
(0.022) (0.026) (0.034) (0.043)
Note: For details, see Table 2.
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Table A3: Treatment-Control Balance (lab sample)
Treatment status
All Control Treated Difference p-value
Male 0.444 0.513 0.365 -0.148 0.005
(0.028) (0.037) (0.034) (0.050)
Age 17.91 17.94 17.89 -0.064 0.609
(0.061) (0.077) (0.098) (0.125)
Household with no parents 0.254 0.229 0.283 0.054 0.009
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020)
Access to tv 3.408 3.348 3.477 0.129 0.228
(0.055) (0.090) (0.055) (0.106)
Business stream 0.385 0.346 0.429 0.083 0.572
(0.073) (0.103) (0.103) (0.145)
Business knowledge 0.264 0.290 0.235 -0.054 0.182
(0.021) (0.030) (0.027) (0.040)
Business ambitions 0.108 0.101 0.116 0.015 0.496
(0.011) (0.012) (0.019) (0.022)
O-level failure rate for school 0.564 0.572 0.554 -0.019 0.697
(0.023) (0.025) (0.040) (0.047)
Note: For details, see Table 2.
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Table A4: Treatment-Control Balance (admin sample)
Treatment status
All Control Treated Difference p-value
Male 0.447 0.518 0.371 -0.148 0.006
(0.027) (0.038) (0.033) (0.050)
Age 17.91 17.93 17.89 -0.043 0.727
(0.061) (0.079) (0.096) (0.124)
Household with no parents 0.258 0.229 0.289 0.059 0.006
(0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020)
Access to tv 3.410 3.360 3.464 0.104 0.327
(0.054) (0.090) (0.055) (0.105)
Business stream 0.383 0.345 0.424 0.079 0.587
(0.072) (0.102) (0.101) (0.144)
Business knowledge 0.256 0.288 0.221 -0.067 0.080
(0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.037)
Business ambitions 0.113 0.103 0.122 0.019 0.403
(0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.022)
O-level failure rate for school 0.564 0.576 0.552 -0.025 0.592
(0.023) (0.025) (0.038) (0.046)
Note: For details, see Table 2.
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Table A5: Treatment-Control Balance (long term sample)
Treatment status
All Control Treated Difference p-value
Male 0.447 0.486 0.406 -0.081 0.406
(0.048) (0.062) (0.073) (0.096)
Age 18.06 17.99 18.14 0.159 0.497
(0.116) (0.127) (0.193) (0.231)
Household with no parents 0.271 0.219 0.326 0.107 0.023
(0.024) (0.031) (0.033) (0.045)
Access to tv 3.459 3.361 3.562 0.201 0.236
(0.086) (0.146) (0.080) (0.167)
Business stream 0.363 0.342 0.384 0.042 0.785
(0.076) (0.103) (0.111) (0.152)
Business knowledge 0.253 0.247 0.261 0.014 0.779
(0.025) (0.031) (0.040) (0.051)
Business ambitions 0.106 0.123 0.087 -0.036 0.347
(0.019) (0.027) (0.027) (0.038)
O-level failure rate for school 0.557 0.565 0.549 -0.016 0.756
(0.026) (0.025) (0.046) (0.052)
Note: For details, see Table 2
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Table A6: Impact on exposure to the edutainment show, full model
Content question Episodes watched
(Incentivized) (Non-incentivized)
Edutainment Weekend movie Edutainment Weekend movie
Treated (edutainment) 1.700∗∗∗ -1.417∗∗∗ 3.326∗∗∗ -1.575∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.134) (0.271) (0.272)
Treated × male 0.113 -0.023 0.209 -0.143
(0.202) (0.180) (0.318) (0.292)
Male -0.227∗ -0.367∗∗∗ -0.170 -0.069
(0.122) (0.134) (0.181) (0.253)
Age -0.123∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗ -0.098
(0.032) (0.036) (0.068) (0.066)
Household with no parents 0.055 -0.095 -0.012 -0.006
(0.087) (0.101) (0.131) (0.129)
Access to tv 0.117∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.134∗∗
(0.036) (0.040) (0.066) (0.065)
Business stream 0.121 0.032 0.442∗ 0.012
(0.119) (0.135) (0.219) (0.191)
Business knowledge 0.032 0.244∗∗ -0.198 -0.161
(0.077) (0.105) (0.175) (0.137)
Business ambitions -0.015 -0.253∗ -0.145 0.136
(0.132) (0.140) (0.203) (0.244)
O-level failure rate for school -1.479∗∗∗ -1.111∗∗ -2.571∗∗∗ -0.929
(0.388) (0.518) (0.910) (0.691)
Constant 6.424∗∗∗ 9.561∗∗∗ 5.974∗∗∗ 5.690∗∗∗
(0.641) (0.693) (1.299) (1.357)
Observations 1898 1898 1850 1882
R2 0.233 0.169 0.326 0.069
Note: Full version of Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗ : p <
0.10,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗∗∗ : p < 0.01)
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Table A7: Impact on exposure to edutainment show – without control variables/upper and
lower bounds on treatment effect
Content question Episodes watched
(Incentivized) (Non-incentivized)
Edutainment Weekend movie Edutainment Weekend movie
Regressions:
Treated (edutainment) 1.713∗∗∗ -1.410∗∗∗ 3.360∗∗∗ -1.575∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.147) (0.311) (0.272)
Treated × male 0.165 -0.021 0.331 -0.143
(0.203) (0.195) (0.314) (0.292)
Male -0.362∗∗∗ -0.514∗∗∗ -0.416∗∗ -0.069
(0.133) (0.156) (0.201) (0.253)
Observations 1915 1915 1867 1882
R2 0.206 0.134 0.298 0.069
Upper and lower bounds on treatment effects:
Male upper bound 2.089 -1.211 4.064 -0.962
(0.193) (0.255) (0.322) (0.215)
Male lower bound 1.695 -1.705 3.577 -1.914
(0.205) (0.250) (0.357) (0.281)
Female upper bound 1.950 -1.239 3.749 -0.914
(0.216) (0.172) (0.347) (0.198)
Female lower bound 1.524 -1.648 3.235 -1.761
(0.186) (0.177) (0.318) (0.292)
Note: Version of Table 4 without control variables and with non-parametric bounds.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗ : p < 0.10,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗∗∗ :
p < 0.01). Upper and lower bounds calculated using the method of Lee (2009). Stan-
dard errors for the bounds are bootstrapped with 1000 replications, resampling at the
school level.
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Table A8: Impact on ambitions, full model
Demand for business training Rating of having Summary
Incentivized Self-report own business index
Treated (edutainment) 0.058∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.119 0.259∗∗
(0.032) (0.039) (0.084) (0.108)
Treated × male -0.045∗ 0.026 0.078 0.015
(0.026) (0.047) (0.104) (0.107)
Male 0.016 -0.054 -0.041 -0.066
(0.018) (0.040) (0.071) (0.091)
Age 0.007 -0.009 -0.004 -0.003
(0.006) (0.011) (0.019) (0.020)
Household with no parents -0.008 0.065∗∗ 0.011 0.075∗
(0.014) (0.026) (0.043) (0.040)
Access to tv 0.001 0.007 0.027 0.028
(0.005) (0.011) (0.023) (0.027)
Business stream -0.017 0.056∗ 0.031 0.068
(0.026) (0.028) (0.062) (0.074)
Business knowledge 0.004 0.028 0.105∗ 0.142∗∗
(0.019) (0.025) (0.057) (0.061)
Business ambitions 0.028 0.070∗∗ 0.139∗ 0.198∗∗
(0.027) (0.034) (0.078) (0.077)
O-level failure rate for school 0.006 -0.255∗∗ -0.101 -0.484∗∗
(0.079) (0.100) (0.156) (0.238)
Constant -0.052 0.832∗∗∗ 2.784∗∗∗ 1.387∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.195) (0.336) (0.344)
Observations 1898 1893 1847 1843
R2 0.008 0.043 0.014 0.038
Note: Full version of Table 5. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗ : p <
0.10,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗∗∗ : p < 0.01)
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Table A9: Impact on ambitions – without control variables/upper and lower bounds on treat-
ment effect
Demand for business training Rating of having Ambition
Incentivized Self-report own business index
Treated (edutainment) 0.060∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.125 0.268∗∗
(0.033) (0.040) (0.085) (0.105)
Treated × male -0.049∗ 0.039 0.070 0.025
(0.027) (0.046) (0.104) (0.114)
Male 0.025 -0.075∗ -0.050 -0.089
(0.016) (0.039) (0.071) (0.091)
Observations 1915 1910 1863 1859
R2 0.006 0.026 0.007 0.022
Upper and lower bounds on treatment effects:
Male upper bound · 0.185 0.266 0.356
(0.046) (0.090) (0.096)
Male lower bound · 0.122 0.094 0.231
(0.042) (0.086) (0.102)
Female upper bound · 0.140 0.181 0.310
(0.048) (0.101) (0.105)
Female lower bound · 0.080 0.040 0.209
(0.040) (0.093) (0.109)
Note: Version of Table 5 without control variables and with non-parametric bounds.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗ : p < 0.10,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗∗∗ :
p < 0.01). Upper and lower bounds calculated using the method of Lee (2009). Stan-
dard errors for the bounds are bootstrapped with 1000 replications, resampling at the
school level. Incentivized business training is chosen by too few participants for it
to be possible to calculate the Lee (2009) bounds for Demand for business training
(incentivized).
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Table A10: Impact on knowledge, full model
Subindices
Macro Business related:
Facts Facts Concepts Practice Knowledge index
Treated (edutainment) 0.038 0.049 -0.170∗ -0.110 -0.192
(0.094) (0.054) (0.097) (0.139) (0.243)
Treated × male 0.141 -0.003 0.051 0.098 0.287
(0.113) (0.066) (0.107) (0.159) (0.284)
Male 0.289∗∗∗ -0.053 0.145∗∗ 0.135 0.517∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.053) (0.069) (0.110) (0.188)
Age -0.051∗ -0.019 0.006 -0.098∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.018) (0.016) (0.038) (0.059)
Household with no parents 0.124∗ 0.034 -0.008 0.040 0.190
(0.073) (0.037) (0.049) (0.091) (0.144)
Access to tv -0.042 0.004 0.022 0.041 0.025
(0.026) (0.016) (0.018) (0.036) (0.059)
Business stream 0.066 0.040 0.260∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.039) (0.086) (0.108) (0.205)
Business knowledge 0.084 -0.032 0.026 -0.002 0.076
(0.074) (0.031) (0.047) (0.091) (0.129)
Business ambitions 0.005 0.056 -0.151∗∗ -0.076 -0.166
(0.097) (0.058) (0.064) (0.123) (0.205)
O-level failure rate for school -0.187 -0.187∗ -0.623∗∗ -1.155∗∗∗ -2.152∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.099) (0.246) (0.277) (0.736)
Constant 3.148∗∗∗ 1.300∗∗∗ 1.525∗∗∗ 6.182∗∗∗ 12.155∗∗∗
(0.462) (0.323) (0.284) (0.657) (1.022)
Constant 3.148∗∗∗ 1.300∗∗∗ 1.525∗∗∗ 6.182∗∗∗ 12.155∗∗∗
(0.462) (0.323) (0.284) (0.657) (1.022)
Observations 1898 1898 1898 1898 1898
R2 0.020 0.009 0.047 0.027 0.042
Note: Full version of Table 6. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗ : p <
0.10,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗∗∗ : p < 0.01)
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Table A11: Impact on knowledge – without control variables/upper and lower bounds on
treatment effect
Subindices
Macro Business related:
Facts Facts Concepts Practice Knowledge index
Treated (edutainment) 0.029 0.048 -0.163 -0.105 -0.192
(0.096) (0.055) (0.111) (0.160) (0.292)
Treated × male 0.176 0.018 0.086 0.166 0.446
(0.111) (0.069) (0.108) (0.171) (0.296)
Male 0.229∗∗∗ -0.076 0.079 -0.010 0.221
(0.075) (0.050) (0.075) (0.114) (0.194)
Observations 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915
R2 0.015 0.004 0.012 0.001 0.007
Upper and lower bounds on treatment effects:
Male upper bound 0.390 0.144 0.020 0.284 0.629
(0.112) (0.068) (0.093) (0.170) (0.298)
Male lower bound 0.050 0.011 -0.180 -0.112 -0.051
(0.109) (0.052) (0.117) (0.167) (0.322)
Female upper bound 0.202 0.125 -0.067 0.095 0.168
(0.120) (0.074) (0.131) (0.186) (0.333)
Female lower bound -0.101 -0.008 -0.254 -0.274 -0.498
(0.116) (0.059) (0.118) (0.159) (0.290)
Note: Version of Table 6 without control variables and with non-parametric bounds.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗ : p < 0.10,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗∗∗ :
p < 0.01). Upper and lower bounds calculated using the method of Lee (2009). Stan-
dard errors for the bounds are bootstrapped with 1000 replications, resampling at the
school level.
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Table A12: Impact on mindset, full model
Mind-set
Risk Patience Compete index
Treated (edutainment) 0.145∗∗ 0.164 -0.056 0.114
(0.069) (0.189) (0.107) (0.133)
Treated × male -0.148∗ -0.210 0.083 -0.102
(0.075) (0.162) (0.079) (0.130)
Male 0.091∗ -0.082 0.008 0.050
(0.049) (0.084) (0.062) (0.089)
Age -0.006 -0.022 0.023 0.013
(0.014) (0.029) (0.016) (0.024)
Household with no parents 0.026 -0.053 -0.032 -0.038
(0.047) (0.083) (0.022) (0.054)
Access to tv 0.009 -0.038 -0.010 -0.018
(0.018) (0.040) (0.016) (0.030)
Business stream -0.084 0.211 0.107 0.141
(0.063) (0.160) (0.087) (0.099)
Business knowledge 0.116∗∗∗ -0.043 -0.061∗ 0.002
(0.034) (0.078) (0.035) (0.062)
Business ambitions 0.073 -0.209∗∗ -0.062 -0.095
(0.056) (0.099) (0.037) (0.069)
O-level failure rate for school 0.117 0.014 -0.453 -0.435
(0.174) (0.422) (0.294) (0.335)
Constant 1.279∗∗∗ 3.901∗∗∗ 0.245 2.772∗∗∗
(0.279) (0.589) (0.359) (0.458)
Observations 1898 1898 1897 1897
R2 0.015 0.015 0.040 0.012
Note: Full version of Table 7. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools
(∗ : p < 0.10,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗∗∗ : p < 0.01)
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Table A13: Impact on mindset – without control variables/upper and lower bounds on treat-
ment effect
Mind-set
Risk Patience Compete index
Treated (edutainment) 0.146∗ 0.144 -0.045 0.120
(0.073) (0.193) (0.111) (0.132)
Treated × male -0.165∗∗ -0.167 0.092 -0.089
(0.074) (0.175) (0.084) (0.133)
Male 0.102∗∗ -0.153 -0.000 0.022
(0.049) (0.104) (0.070) (0.096)
Observations 1915 1915 1914 1914
R2 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.002
Upper and lower bounds on treatment effects:
Male upper bound 0.088 0.157 0.089 0.208
(0.080) (0.150) (0.099) (0.131)
Male lower bound -0.110 -0.230 0.022 -0.062
(0.076) (0.185) (0.100) (0.136)
Female upper bound 0.238 0.303 -0.005 0.274
(0.067) (0.229) (0.114) (0.147)
Female lower bound 0.067 -0.039 -0.069 0.011
(0.083) (0.182) (0.113) (0.123)
Note: Version of Table 7 without control variables and with non-parametric bounds.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗ : p < 0.10,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗∗∗ :
p < 0.01). Upper and lower bounds calculated using the method of Lee (2009). Stan-
dard errors for the bounds are bootstrapped with 1000 replications, resampling at the
school level.
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Table A14: Impact on social preferences
Incentivized
Unfairness
Money for Proportional of salary
self bonus inequality
Treated (edutainment) 0.021 0.034 0.024
(0.022) (0.038) (0.093)
Treated × male -0.036 -0.051 0.053
(0.021) (0.045) (0.117)
Male 0.028 0.076∗∗ -0.117
(0.017) (0.030) (0.080)
Treatment on males -0.015 -0.017 0.077
(0.019) (0.044) (0.099)
Observations 1898 1898 1893
R2 0.015 0.019 0.005
Statistics on dependent variable (in control group):
Mean 0.619 0.728 3.966
Standard deviation 0.212 0.445 1.550
Note: The table reports linear regressions in which the dependent variable is: column
1, the share of money the participant allocated to him- or herself out of 2000 TSh in
a real-effort dictator game; column 2, an indicator variable taking the value one if the
participant in a spectator choice decided to divide proportionality (and not equally) in a
spectator choice involving two other participants; column 3, the participant’s response
to an hypothetical question about whether an income difference between a teacher
and a doctor is fair (1-5, 1-the income difference is completely fair, 5-the income
difference is completely unfair). Treated: indicator variable for the participant being in
the treatment group. Treated × male: interaction variable between Treated and Male.
Male: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant is a male. Also included
in the regressions but not reported are the other background variables reported in Table
2. See Table A15 for full regressions including all controls. Treatment on Males: the
linear combination of Treated and Treated × male. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered on schools (∗ : p < 0.10,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗∗∗ : p < 0.01).
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Table A15: Impact on social preferences, full model
Incentivized
Unfairness
Money for Proportional of salary
self bonus inequality
Treated × male -0.036 -0.051 0.053
(0.021) (0.045) (0.117)
Male 0.028 0.076∗∗ -0.117
(0.017) (0.030) (0.080)
Age 0.003 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.014
(0.005) (0.009) (0.031)
Household with no parents -0.028∗∗∗ 0.019 0.066
(0.009) (0.024) (0.076)
Access to tv -0.002 -0.004 -0.027
(0.005) (0.011) (0.029)
Business stream -0.017 0.041 0.039
(0.017) (0.029) (0.079)
Business knowledge 0.029∗∗ -0.002 -0.039
(0.014) (0.024) (0.083)
Business ambitions -0.035∗∗ -0.007 -0.047
(0.015) (0.028) (0.121)
O-level failure rate for school -0.056 -0.268∗∗ -0.437∗
(0.039) (0.120) (0.227)
Constant 0.593∗∗∗ 1.319∗∗∗ 4.617∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.179) (0.596)
Observations 1898 1898 1893
R2 0.015 0.019 0.005
Note: Full version of Table A14. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on
schools (∗ : p < 0.10,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗∗∗ : p < 0.01)
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Table A16: Impact on social preferences – without control variables/upper and lower bounds
on treatment effect
Incentivized
Unfairness
Money for Proportional of salary
self bonus inequality
Treated (edutainment) 0.019 0.034 0.036
(0.021) (0.040) (0.095)
Treated × male -0.041∗ -0.036 0.071
(0.022) (0.043) (0.117)
Male 0.031∗ 0.044 -0.149∗∗
(0.016) (0.028) (0.072)
Observations 1915 1915 1910
R2 0.003 0.002 0.002
Upper and lower bounds on treatment effects:
Male upper bound 0.002 0.015 0.182
(0.023) (0.047) (0.103)
Male lower bound -0.043 -0.051 -0.090
(0.017) (0.054) (0.159)
Female upper bound 0.044 0.053 0.093
(0.025) (0.044) (0.102)
Female lower bound 0.002 -0.010 -0.147
(0.021) (0.045) (0.143)
Note: Version of Table A14 without control variables and with non-parametric bounds.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗ : p < 0.10,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗∗∗ :
p < 0.01). Upper and lower bounds calculated using the method of Lee (2009). Stan-
dard errors for the bounds are bootstrapped with 1000 replications, resampling at the
school level.
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Table A17: Long-term behavior – with and without control variables
A. With control variables
Administrative Long-term survey
Passed Have Is Is
final exam started currently currently Have
business a student employed moved
Treated (Edutainment) -0.233∗∗∗ 0.081 -0.099 -0.073 0.106
(0.067) (0.069) (0.077) (0.064) (0.077)
Treated × male 0.077 -0.059 -0.200∗ 0.067 -0.087
(0.058) (0.109) (0.115) (0.075) (0.094)
Male 0.065∗ 0.001 0.127 -0.084 -0.067
(0.037) (0.062) (0.082) (0.054) (0.076)
Treatment on males -0.156∗∗ 0.022 -0.299∗∗∗ -0.007 0.020
(0.064) (0.086) (0.094) (0.056) (0.068)
Observations 2024 281 281 279 281
R2 0.164 0.022 0.141 0.025 0.095
B. Without control variables
Administrative Long-term survey
Passed Have Is Is
final exam started currently currently Have
form business a student employed moved
Treated (Edutainment) -0.227∗∗∗ 0.088 -0.124 -0.073 0.139∗∗
(0.084) (0.067) (0.076) (0.063) (0.069)
Treated × male 0.103 -0.102 -0.192 0.050 -0.058
(0.064) (0.121) (0.139) (0.077) (0.082)
Male -0.026 0.028 0.020 -0.061 -0.058
(0.047) (0.068) (0.078) (0.060) (0.059)
Treatment on males -0.124 -0.014 -0.316∗∗ -0.023 0.081
(0.084) (0.093) (0.122) (0.060) (0.069)
Observations 2039 281 284 282 284
R2 0.038 0.022 0.056 0.010 0.029
Statistics on dependent variable (in control group):
Mean 0.655 0.267 0.610 0.144 0.199
Standard deviation 0.475 0.444 0.490 0.352 0.400
Note: The upper panel in the table reports linear regressions in which the dependent variable is: column
1, an indicator variable taking the value one if the participant passed the final O-level exam; column
2, an indicator variable taking the value one if the participant has started a business; column 3, an
indicator variable taking the value one if the participant is currently a student, column 4, an indicator
variable taking the value one if the participant is currently employed; column 5, an indicator variable
taking the value one if the participant has moved since the short-term survey. Treated: indicator variable
for the participant being in the treatment group. Treated × male: interaction variable between Treated
and Male. Male: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant is a male. Also included in
the regressions but not reported are the other background variables reported in Table 2. Treatment on
Males: the linear combination of Treated and Treated × male. The lower panel in the table shows the
corresponding regressions without control variables. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on
schools (∗ : p < 0.10,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗∗∗ : p < 0.01). 53
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